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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
a taxpayer or a competitive bidder may interfere in these cases;
the taxpayer by enjoining the letting of the contract" or by re-
fusal to pay taxes assessed for payment of such work," the bid-
der by mandamus to compel the contract to be let to him or by
injunction to restrain the letting to a higher bidder."
This strict rule of enforcement seems to be the better view.
If the contractor is allowed to recover on quantum meruit the
purpose of the requirement is defeatea. The measure of recovery
where defendant repudiates and the plaintiff has performed is
the value of the work done, of which the contract may be ev-
idence." If the contractor can recover possibly as much as the
contract price in quasi-contract in case the contract is held void,
why should he worry about the city's compliance with statutory
requirements in letting the contract? The answer is obvious.
The penalty for failure to comply is removed and the door is
opened to indifference and fraud in the letting of public con-
tracts.
-PAUL S. HUDGINS.
TORTS-REcOVERY WHERE IMVIENTAL DISTRESS IS SOuE INJURY-
EFFECT OF WI uLN=ss.-The plaintiff, a widow, owed a small
claim on which her wages were exempt. Defendant, collecting
agency, wrote her several letters, threatened to sue her on the claim,
to appeal to her employer, and intimated that her action was as
bad as a criminal's. No threat had reference to physical violence.
The letters caused her much worry and mental anguish. In a suit
for damages, she neither alleged nor proved any resultant physical
injury. From verdict and judgment for the plaintiff the defendant
appealed. The decision of the lower court was upheld on the
grounds that the defendant had willfully and intentionally caused
the plaintiff anguish and suffering. Barnett v. Collection Service
Co..'
"Murphy v. City of Greensboro, 190 N. C. 268, 129 S. E. 614 (1925);
Kratz v. City of Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 AtI. 116 (1931).
31 Twiss v. City of Huron, 63 -Mich. 528, 30 N. W. 177 (1886). See also
Moundsville v. Yost, 75 W. Va. 224, 83 S. E. 910 (1914).
"Federal Construction Co. v. Ryan, 47 Cal. App. 637, 191 Pac. 69 (1920).
And see note (1895) 50 Am. St. Rep. 489. But the lowest bidder cannot
maintain an action at law for failure to award the contract to him. People
ex rel. Haeeker Sterling Co. v. City of Buffalo, 176 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1919).
'3WOODWARD ON QUAsI-CONTRACTS (1913) § 268.
1242 N. W. 26 (Iowa 1932).
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The decision is contrary to the usual rule denying recovery
for mental anguish and suffering alone even though intentionally
inflicted.2 Where an actionable tort such as false imprisonment is
otherwise made out3 or the plaintiff is able to show physical injury
consequent upon the mental distress," it will be considered in fixing
the measure of damages. This inadequate protection of interests
of personality is due to the nature of the interest.' Injuries to
feelings are hardly measurable in pecuniary terms and risk of
fraud and imposition in the proof of such claims is clearly sub-
stantial. This latter difficulty, a problem of administration which
is especially evident in jury litigation, is the more serious one.
The law should not be gravely concerned if a jury were to penalize
an intentional wrongdoer, absent a better remedy. But where
there is no concrete manifestation of the injury the chance of
imposition is really serious. The extent of the application here,
moreover, of the de minimis maxim is quite vague. Certainly the
law cannot safely attempt to protect the special personal interests
of the over-sensative and eccentric unless deliberately invaded.'
The administrative obstacle is overcome where the nervous illness
2 Maze v. Employer's Loan Soc., 217 Ala. 44, 114 So. 574 (1927) ; Brooker
v. Silverthrone, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350 (1919); Kgramer v. Rickameir,
159 Ia. 48, 139 N. W. 1091 (1913). See Restatement of Torts, Tentative
Draft (Am. L. Inst. 1929, § 188 (b).
The Iowa cases cited by the court in the principal case in support of its
decision are consistent with this rule since the right to recovery in these cases
was based on additional circumstances. See notes 3 and 4, infra.
OLowergan v. Small, 81 Kan. 48, 105 Pac. 27 (1909) (assault); Larson v.
Chase, 47 Minn. 3G7, 50 N. W. 238 (1891) (invasion of right to custody of
corpse of deceased relative); Garrison v. Sun Pub. Co., 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N.
E. 430 (1912) (slander); Nordren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 Pac. 436
(1913) (trespass); Beckwoth v. Bean, 98 U. S. 266 (1878) (false
imprisonment); Black v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 218 Fed. 239 (1914); Vinal
v. Core and Compton, 18 W. Va. 1 (1881) (malicious prosecution).
'Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S. W. 15 (1920); Wilkinson v.
Downton, 2 Q. B. 57 (1897).
'It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure subjective interests in objective
pecuniary terms. Thus only specific relief would be satisfactory. See Pound,
Equitable Belief Against Defamation and Injuries of Personality (1916)
29 HARV. L. REv. 640; Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights
(1923) 33 YALE L. J. 115. That equity is beginning to afford some measure
of specific redress, see Bazemore v. Savanah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257,
155 S. E. 194 (1930) ; Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919).
1 See Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28 HARv. L. RaV. 343, 359;
Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. St. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905); Smith v.
Postal Tel. Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N. E. 380 (1889); Davis v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 46 W. Va. 48, 32 S. E. 1026 (1899). But see Green v. Shoemaker,
111 Md. 69, 73 AUt. 698 (1909) (these practical considerations deemed in-
sufficient to defeat a recovery).
'Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
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has been so intense and extended as to be definitely provable or
where there has been an intentional public humiliation falling
short of actionable defamation.' This is to a less extent true of the
telegraph cases, which otherwise are somewhat anomalous."0
By dictum in the principal case had the injury been the con-
sequence merely of negligence there would have been no liability.
The negligence situation is affected by additional considerations,-
the peculiar requisites of tortious negligence such as forseeability,
and the absence of the element of intent. At best this makes a
weaker case.
-BONN BROWN.
VENUE - AcToNs OR SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
The West Virginia venue statute provides that an action or suit
may be brought in the county where the cause of action arose, if
the defendant or, if there be more than one defendant, one or
more defendants is a corporation.' The plaintiff was injured in
Monongalia county by an automobile owned by the defendant
county court and operated by the sheriff and a deputy of the de-
fendant county. Suit was brought in Monongalia county in re-
liance upon the statute. The court sustained a plea in abatement,
on behalf of the county court. Edmonson v. County Court of
Hancock County.
It is the majority rule that a county court must be sued in
its home county,' unless by express statutory provision it may be
8 Great Ati. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 AtI. 22 (1930);
May v. Western Union, 157 N. C 416, 72 S. E. 1059 (1911).
Nickerson v. Hodges, supra n. 7; Davis v. Tacoma Ry. Co., 35 Wash. 203,
77 Pac. 209 (1904). Contra: Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54 (1858).10 1n five states recovery has been allowed on common law principles for
such injury. Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. 1
(1895); Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Ky. 265, 13 S. W. 880
(1890); Barnes v. Western Union Tel. Co., 27 Nev. 438, 76 Pac. 93 (1904);
Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 261, 11 S. E. 1044 (1889); Hale
V. Bonner and Eddy, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S. W. 615 (1891). Contra: Davis v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 46 W. Va. 48, 32 S. E. 1026 (1899).
Mental distress is a normal reaction to non-delivery, for example, of a death
message. Two courts, however, have seen fit to allow recovery where the
message was not one pertaining either to death or serious illness. Barnes v.
Western Union Tel. Co., supra; Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N. C.
489, 49 S. E. 165 (1904).
2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 1, § 2.
0166 S. E. 117 (1932).
'Feming v. Floyd County, 131 Ga. 545, 62 S. E. 814 (1908); Cullmn
County v. Blount County, 160 Ala. 319, 49 So. 315 (1909).
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